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At its sitti~g cf 12 January 1983, the European Parliament referred the follcwing 
motions for resolutions to the Political Affairs Committee pursuant to Rule 47 of the 
Rules of Procedure: 
-motion for a resolution tabled by_Mr ZAGARI and others on the threat to peace posed by 
the emergence of international links between some secret services and their efforts to 
destabilize countries in the Western hemisphere <doe. 1-1074/82>, 
-motion for a resolution tabled by Mr ANTONIOZZI and others on the international links 
between secret services and on their destabilizing activities in Western countries 
<doe. 1-1076/82> 
At its sitting of 13 January 1983, the European Parliament adopted a resolution 
on destabilizing activities of Eastern countries• secret services on the territory of 
the Community and the Western World and instructed the Political Affairs Committee to 
draw up a report on this subject. 
At its sitting of 6 June 1983, the European Parliament referred the following 
motion for a resolution to the Political Affairs Committee pursuant to Rule 47 of 
the Rules of Procedure: 
- motion for a resolution tabled by Mr HABSBURG and others on attempted terrorist 
subversion in the Member States and various associated countries Cdoc. 1-361/83) 
CThe Legal Affairs Committee have been asked for their opinion on this document). 
At its meeting of 22-24 February 1983, the Political Affairs Committee deciced 
to draw up a report and at its meeting of 24-25 May 1983 it appointed Lord 8EiHELL 
rapporteur. 
The Political Affairs Committee considered this draft report at its meetings of 
28-30 September 1983, 2-3 November 1983 and 25-27 January 1984. 
At the Latter meeting, the motion for a resolution was adopted by 14 votes to 6 
with 2 abstentions. 
The following took part in the vote: Mr Rumor, chairman; Mr Haagerup, first 
vice-chairman; Lord Bethell, rapporteur; Mr Bouclet (deputizing for Mr Klepsch), 
Mr Bournias, Mr Deschamps, Lady Elles, Mr Ephremedis, Mrs Gaiotti de Biase 
<deputizing for Mr Antoniozzi), Mr Galluzzi <deputizing for Mr Pajetta), 
Mr Gerokostopoulos (deputizing for Mr Barbi), Mr Habsburg, Mr HMnsch, Mrs Hammerich, 
Mr Israel <deputizing for Mr de la Malene), Mr Mommersteeg (deputizing for Mr Penders), 
Mr Newton Dunn, Mr Romualdi, Mr Schall, Sir James Scott-Hopkins, Mr Segre, Mr Walter 
and Mr Wurtz <deputizing for Mr Piquet). 
This repor: ~as :abLsd ~n 27 January 1984. 
The deadline for tabling amendments to this report appears in the draft agenda 
for the part-session at which it is to be considered. 
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A 
The Political Affairs Committee hereby submits to the European Parliament 
the following motion for a resolution together with explantory statement. 
~QI!Q~_EQB_8_8g§QbYI!Q~ 
on destabilizing activities of Eastern countries' secret services on the territory 
of the Community and the Western World 
- having regard to the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr ZAGARI and others on 
the threat to peace posed by the emergence of international Links between 
some secret services and their efforts to destabilize countries in the Western 
hemisphere <doc.1-1074/82), 
- having regard to the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr ANTONIOZZI and others 
on the international links between secret services and on their destabilizing 
activities in Western countries (doc.1-1076/82), 
I 
- having regard to the resolution adopted by the European Parliament on 13 
January 1983 on destabilizing activities of Eastern countries' secret services 
on the territory of the Community and the Western World1 
- having regard to the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr HABSBURG and others 
on attempted terrorist subversion in the Member States and various associated 
countries <doc.1-361/83), 
- having regard to the report by the Political Affairs Committee 
<Doe. 1-1343/83), 
A. Recalling that the Soviet Union and her allies undertook by their adherence 
to the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
to refrain from any intervention in the internal or external affairs 
of other participating states, in particular from any direct or indirect 
assistance to terrorist activities, 
B. Deeply concerned by the facts that are emerging from the official Italian 
investigations into the attempted murder of Pope John Paul II and by the 
consequent crisis in Italy's relations with Bulgaria, 
1oJ :"-10. c 42, 14.2.1983 
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C. Convinced that any support, practical or moral, provided by the Soviet 
Union or her allies to terrorists operating in countries of the European 
Community seriously damages the prospect of improved East-West relations, 
D. Noting that the Soviet intelligence services have in recent years intensified 
their campaign of "active measures", with the aim of sowing discord in 
Community countries and disrupting their alliances, 
E. Pointing to various recent cases where Soviet diplomatic representatives 
in the Community have recruited citizens of the Community for the campaign 
of "active measures", including the distribution of forged documents, as 
well as for espionage purposes, 
F. Noting with alarm that 64 Soviet officials have been expelled from 
Community countries during the period January-September 1983, mainly for 
involvement in technical and scientific espionage, a figure indicating 
increased Soviet involvement in the field of espionage also. 
1. Calls on the Foreign Ministers meeting in political cooperation to 
deliberate on the consequences of the activities of Eastern countries' 
secret services on the territory of the Community; 
2. Invites the Foreign Ministers to evaluate the effect of the Soviet Union's 
"active measures" campaign on Community interests and, if necessary, to 
address a joint submission to the Soviet Government on this subject; 
3. Invites the Foreign Ministers to carry out a similar study of Soviet 
technical and scientific espionage activity, with a view to a similar 
joint submission; 
4. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, 
the Council, the Foreign Ministers meeting in political cooperation, the 
governments of the Member States and the governments of Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania and the Soviet Union. 
- 6 - PE 87.279/fin. 
B 
Terms of Reference 
In attempting to report to the European Parliament about the "destabilising 
activities" of the Soviet Union and her allies, I am anxious at the outset 
to define which activities are cP.ant. 1 assume that the main topic of tbi& 
report must be international terrorism generally and the attecpt on the life 
of Pope John Paul II in particular. It was this last event that motivated 
colleagues to draft Motions for Resolutions and initiate th~ ~eport. 
However, the Motions refer not only to terrorism and the attempt on the Pope's 
lite. They mention international links between east Europear •ecret services 
and efforts made by these services to destabilise western countries. I have 
therefore thought it necessary to report to Parliament in t.~rms wider than 
terrorism which cover any activity by the Soviet Union and her allies deemed 
dangerous, clandestine or improper. 
V.bat are these "icproper" antt "destabilizing" activities? We know that there is 
today an adversarial relationship between the So,•iet bloc and western Europe. 
~ine of our Community members belong to the North Atlantic alliance, and the 
tenth, Ireland, although neutral militarily, is ideologically an ally of the 
otbers. The Soviet Union is the dominant nation of "';~e Warsaw Pact. 
The two groups of European nations are therefore in conflict, militarily and 
ideologically. We regret this. It is expensive and dangerous. We would pre!er 
detente and we are hoping to achieve detente. l:lut our efforts in this direction 
are hindered by a number--of factors: disputes over i~fluence in the Third 
World, dissatisfaction over t~e division of Europe, the separation of peoples 
and families, above all by the problems that naturally arise when a group of 
countries governed by the principles of .Marx and Lenin con!ront at their borders 
countrie& with government& elected on a multi-party basis. 
This very !act, the Community's commitment to plurali~t democracy, causes a 
further complication. We are not monolithic and we do not believe that we are 
infallible. We admit the nght of other ideologies to carry on political 
activity, to try and gather &upport, perhaps even to gain power. We allow all 
shades of non-violent opinion, including those that reject the western alliance, 
even those that support our adversary, the Soviet Union. A minority of people 
in the Community do support the Soviet Union and they are represented in the 
european Parliament. 
It therefore !ollows that the Soviet Union and her allies are free to dis-
seminate their point of view throughout the Community and, operating openly 
through their representatives, to present arguments in favour of their internal 
and external interests. And the fact that Soviet-bloc countries do not reciprocate, 
that they refuse to allow any but the Marxi&t-Leninist view to be disseminated 
in their own territory, is not seen as &ufticient reason to withdraw their right 
to enjoy these privileges. 
Radio Moscow broadcasts to western Europe in English, French, Italian and 
Greek. Its broadcasts are not jammed, even though west European broadcasts to 
- 7 - PE 87.279/fin. 
.he ~oviet Union ~ jammed. Soviet publication& are available in the West 
m subscription at subsidised rates. There are 22 available in Britain alone . 
. estern journal& frequently print articles and letter& written by Soviet 
·epresentatives, invariably putting forward the Soviet government's point of 
Jiew. The Soviet side does not reciprocate. 
5oviet-bloc diplomats in western Europe cultivate personal relations with 
•nfluential people from many walks of life in the countries to which they 
1re accredited, entertaining them and explaining the Soviet viewpoint. They 
1lso oaintain links with local communist parties: and other leftist groups, 
1mong whom there are many who share the Soviet ideology and are ready to as:sist 
the Soviet government politically and in other practical way&. 
~is Soviet-bloc activity, designed as it often is: to present the western 
1lliance as aggressive and its leaders as warmongers, to stir up public 
)pinion against the alliance and to stimulate disagreement within it, to 
~ortray as a myth the evidence of Soviet arms expansion, to denounce a5 
''interference" or "anti-Soviet propaganda" or "red-baiting" any expression 
)f concern over oppressive Soviet policies at home or abroad, can certainly 
Je termed confrontational and adversarial. It& unfairness angers majorit. 
~·est European public opinion, especially since we are refused access to east 
European press or media and denied a chance to set the record straight. 
However, in your rapporteur's view, since such activity is open and !)Ublic, 
it is not improper and it has no destabilising effect. It is part of the 
uneasy relationship that is bound to exist between countries that challe .e 
one another's system of government on moral as well as political grounds, while 
at the same time maintaining diplomatic representatives in each other's capital 
cities and t~·ing to maintain the peace. 
The Soviet Union and Terrorism 
Terrcri5::n is part of the Soviet Union's historical back&round. It was part of 
the ph1losophy of the 19th century Socialist Revolutionaries who assassinated 
Tsar Alexander 11. During the Russian uprising of lYOS Lenin instructed the 
Bolsheviks of St Petersburg to "supply each group with brief and simple 
recipes for mal::ing bombs" and to "undertake to kill a spy or blow up a 
police station". He added, "let every group learn, if it is only by beating 
up a policeman." Likewise Trotsky pointed out the important political ef!ect 
of the terrorist act: "It kills individuals d~d intimidates thousands.'' 
After the October 1~17 revolution the Soviet leaders continued to authorise 
the use of terror in western countries, mainly against former Soviet citizens 
deemed particularly dangerous. Tv.·o of their cost famous victims are Walter 
Kriv1tsky, once head of Soviet military intelligence in western Europe, 
murdered by the NhVD in the United States in 1941, and Stefan Bandera, 
killed by the KGB in West Germany in 1959. During the past twenty years, 
however, there is no conclusive evidence to suggest that the KGB have 
themselves carried out acts of murder in Community countries. 
Jliowadays the Soviet Union supports "national liberation movements" and 
encourages them in the use of force against colonialism or foreign occupation. 
For instance, the Palestine Liberation Organisation representative at the 
United l'i:nions, Zehdi Labib Terzi, said in 1979, "They (the Soviet t:'nion) 
Give us full support- diplomatic, moral, educational- and also they open 
their military academies to some of our freedom fighters." He also made it 
clear ~ha~ the ?LO receives military equipment :!roe the Soviet ~n~on. Tne 
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Soviet Union ~as also given facilities to t~e African National Congress and 
to Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African Peoples Union. This includes training, 
equipment, propaganda material and rest and recreation facilities. 
At the 25th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in 1976 Leonid Bres.hne-, 
said, "Our party supports and will continue to support peoples fighting 
!or their freedom •••• We act as we are bidden by our revolutionary conscience 
and our cocnunist convictions." 
This report makes no value judgement on such organisations as ANC, ZAPU 
and the PLO. Soce in the J::uropean Parliament will see their members 'lS 
terrorists, others as freedom fighters. The line between the two is hard 
to distinguish. This means, however, that the Soviet policy of assisting 
national liberation movements is also on occasion hard to distingui~~ fro~ 
aid to terrorism. 
For instance, Soviet puolications regularly present the crisis in Northern 
Ireland as a popular uprising by an oppressed colonial community against 
British imperialism, ascribing sectarian differences to a 4Upposed British 
policy of "divide and rule". An I:n•estiya article in February 1983 clail:led 
that Protestant extrecists were carrying out genocide against the Catholic 
population and that shooting at "living targets" had become "a collllllon 
occupation of l:!ri tish tommies". The vioience of the Irish Republican Army 
is hardly ever mentioned. 
In March the newsagency Tass accused Britain of abandoning the search for 
a political solution in ~orthern Ireland and of trying to "preserve 
colonial practices by intensi:fying terror and repression". A former Pravda 
correspondent in London, V.V. Ov~~innikov, in a recent book accused Britain 
of using northern Ireland as a "training ground" tor her ar~ed :forces, to 
give them the experience they would need to deal with future uprisings by 
British workers. 
Soviet-dominated international bodies maintain a continuing int;rest in 
Northern Ireland. The World Peace Council issued a statement ccndemning 
Britain's "continuing military oppression" in May 1981, at the time of the 
death of hunger-striker Bobby Sands. The World Federation o:f Trade Unions, 
based in Prague, backed the H-r1vck prisoners' demands during the first 
hunger strike in November 1980 ~~d its newspaper Voice reproduced an H-block 
Committee leaflet in ten languages. 
In October 1971 weapons bought by Irish terrorists :from the Omnipol arms 
:factory in C~echoslovakia were intercepted in Amsterdam and in November 
1977 a large quantity of east European armacents, including Kaleshnikov 
rifles, were discovered in Antwerp on their way to Dublin. Soviet and east 
European weapons are often discovered in Northern Ireland, although most 
of them have been bought on the open market in the Middle East. 
Although there is no conclusive evidence linking the Soviet Union with the 
Provisional IRA, there is little doubt that the Soviet authorities encourage 
Irish terrorists with inflammatory statements, indicating that they are 
indeed a liberation move~ent fighting a colonial oppressor. Press reports 
have suggested that three Soviet officials expelled by the Irish government 
in September 1983 !or "unacceptable activity" had visited Northern Ireland 
and been in touch ·,:;i tb. extremist groups. 
The Soviet authorities' link with the PLO, which is established, has in 
the past resulted in terrorist activity on west European territory. In 1973 
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a trainload of Soviet Jewi10h emigres was seized nea::- 'Jienna by PLO fighters 
who had croliiliied fully armed into Austria from Czechoslovakia. This border 
is very closely guarded and they could hardly have cros10ed without Czechoslovak 
and Soviet approval. 
A number of well ~nown v ~st European terrorists have r.ade frequent visits 
to the Soviet bloc. Red Brigade leader Renato Curcio had Czechoslovak visas 
in both his real and his fake passports when he was arrested in 1974. During 
the April 1978 trial in Turin of Red Brigade's terrorists accused of 
kidnapping a Fiat executive it was alleged that one of the gang had been 
trained at a cacp in Czechoslovakia 
The following montn the Rome publ~cation Il Setticanale published detail&, 
allegedly leaked b~ the Italian security services, of the training of Italians 
and Germans near Karlovy Vary in c~echoslovakia. Students received training, 
according to the r.lticle, in sabotage, use of explosives and forgery of documents. 
During the 1970s there were close links between German terrorists and the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. In 1970 a group including 
Andreas Saader and Ulricke Meinbof was trained at a PFLP camp in Jordan. 
There f~ilowed a series of incidents involving collaboration between German 
and Palestinian terrorists: ,the raid on the OPEC neadquarters in Vienna in 
Decewber 1975, the hijacking six months later of an Air France airliner to 
Entebbe (Uganda) and the hijacking of a Lufthansa aircraft in October 1~77. 
In view of Soviet assistance to the PLO and its offliihoot the PFLP, it appears 
that th~..-~ was an indirect link between the Soviet Union and var1ous Italian 
and Gerrnan ~errorist groups, the Palestinians being intermediaries. One cannot 
be certain to what extent these l~nks were forged by Soviet intelligence 
with the clear aim of dest.abilising west European soc~ety, but there can be 
no doubt t~at the effect of the cooperat1on ~ destabilising. 
Community citizens have been thrown into the web of intrigue that •urrounds 
the Soviet Union'lii admitted assistance to nat1onal liberat1on covements. 
For instance, Siegfried Haag, according to D1e Zeit in Apr~l 1977, was 
employed as ~ training officer at a camp for guerilla fighters in the 
People's De=ocratic Republic of Yemen·, a country under Soviet influence. 
The Soviet Union and her allies adcit such activity and take pr~de in it. 
The GDR official collllDunist newspaper ~eues Deutschland revealed in August 
1980 that more than 2,300 "patriots" had in recent years received ced1cal 
treatment in GDR hospitals, n:ar1y of them wounded in "lib€r~>tion struggles". 
Some mel:lbers of the European Parliaoent would doubtless look syopathetically 
on some of the individuals wounded in some of the liberation strugeles re!erred 
to in the Heues Deutschland article. However, it is your rapporteur's view 
that the Soviet Union and her allies interpret the term "national liberation 
struggle" in a narrow, carefully defined sense. They do not, for instance, 
support national liberation struggles in Poland or Afgbaniliitan. They support 
mainly those struggles which are likely to favour Soviet foreign policy and 
disrupt the Community or her allies. 
These struggles, irrespective of their Ol''ll intrinsic merit, often attract 
individual Cor.munity citizens who reject our democratic institution3 and 
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strive to overthrow our systems of government by violent means. Therefore, 
although there is no conclusive evicence of direct Soviet involvement in 
terrorist groups operating in Community countries- or, if there is, such 
evidence is not releasable for security or diplomatic re~ns - it seems 
clear that the Community suffers :from the "spill-over" into western Europe 
of the conflicts that the Soviet Union encourages. And fast-~est relations are 
oound to suffer in consequence. 
Te~rorism and Bulgaria 
1here is evidence to suggest that the Bulgarian government is less inhibited 
than the Kreclin and other allied governments in the use of terrorism and 
violence outGide her borders. 
ln July 1973 a Bulgarian exile, Boris Arnoff, disappeared froc his home in 
Aarhus, Dennark. Shortly afterwards he appeared beFore a Sofia court charged 
with anti-state activity. He was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment. He died 
in prison a :few months later. The Cocmunist Youth periodical Narodna Mladeh · 
then printed an article about the "traitor" Arnof:f announcing that "the same 
!ate awaits anyone who :forgets the ideals of the :fatherland". 
In August 1978 another Bulgarian defector, Vladimir Kostov, was leaving the 
Paris cetro with his wife when he felt a sharp pain in his thigh. He developed 
a high fever, which lasted three days. He then recovered. 
Ten days later Georgi Markov, another Bu1~arian who also worted for the emigre 
radio station Radio Free £urope, was walk.a.ng near the BBC offices in Aldwych, 
London, when he too felt a sudden pain in his leg. He turned round and saw a 
man, who seemed foreign, running away. 
That evening (September 7th) Markov develc-ped a :fever and the next day he was 
admitted to hospital. Three days later h~ died. An examination o:f his body 
revealed a circular area of in:flam:nation on the right thigh v.·ith a central 
puncture mark about two millimetres in diameter. 
Further examination showed that beneath the ~ictim's skin there was a spherical 
piece of metal 1.52 millimetres in diameter and made o! a platinum/iridium alloy 
used cainly in the aircraft industry, pierced with four tiny boles. According to 
the scientists 'lt'ho gave evidence at Markov' s inquest, such an object could only 
be made with ~he aid of a high-temperature furnace and precision drilling 
equ1.pment. 
The inque&t concluded that Markov had been killed by the introduction of poison 
into his bloodstream by means of this pellet. The London police carried out 
enquiries :for many months and in many countries, but the murderer was not !o~,d. 
After these facts were published, Vladimir Kostov recal~dhis own experience 
in the Paris metro and went in for a medical examination. An X-ray o:f his thigh 
revealed a small metal object. Detectives came to Paris :from London and, in 
their presence, a French surgeon removed a two-centimetre square of flesh that 
contained the object. Microscopic examination of the object showed that it was 
ldentical to the one found in Markov's body. 
French and British scientists are not sure wbat poison was used to kill Markov 
and nearly kill Kostov, but they suspect that it was ricin, an extremely toxic 
and little-known substance derived from the castor oil plant. 
French and British police are likewise unable to prove who was responsible :for 
the two murderous attacks, however, they have noted the coincidence of the two 
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attacks on two well-known Bulgarian defectors taking place within a :few days 
of each other. They have also observed the extreme technical sophistication 
with which the curder weapon in each case, a tiny metal object, was manufactured. 
Your rapporteur believes that the coincidence o! the two attacks makes it 
most probable that the motive in each case was political. He does not believe 
that any private individual or emigre group would have the technical resources 
to produce the murder weapon or the chemical knowledge to make such a highly 
concentrated poision. He recalls that the Bulgarian authorities had a sound 
moti ,.e for wishing to silence two former citizens who were criticising them 
regularly and fiercely in radio broadcasts. 
He believes, in short, that it was the Bulgarian authorities, probably with 
the knowledge of the Soviet authorities, that committed both crimes. 
The Attecpt on the Life of Pooe John Paul II 
Tnis report makes no attempt to apportion blame or to reach a verdict on 
this crime, which is presently being investigated by Judge Ilaric Martella 
and the Italian authorities. We can only hope that the investigators will 
eventually discover and reveal the whole truth about the execution of this 
:!'oul deed. 
However, a political problem has been raised by the allegation made by the 
assassin llehmet Ali Agca that the act which took place on ~lay 13U,. 1981, 
was conceived in a Sofia hotel room where another Turk, Bekir Celenk, o:!:fered 
n1m ~1.7 million to shoot the Pope. Agca identified three Bulgarian officials 
!roe photographs, including the chief of the Bulgarian airline o!fice in 
Rome, Sergei Antonov, and accused then~f involvement in the plot. 
Abca bave Judge Martella a description o! Antonov's apartcent. The description 
turned out to be accurate. It was also established that Agca had spent 50 
days in Bulgaria during the summer o! 1980, after being sentenced to death 
in Turkey, and that after leaving Bulgaria on August 31st he travelled through 
western 1urope, staying in hotels, spending money but cashing no ch~ues. 
In ~ovember 1983 the Italian police arrested Antonov. 
The existence o:f a prima facie case fer Bulgarian involvement in the crime, 
perhaps even Soviet involvecent, has caused a crisis in relations between Italy 
and Bulgaria, one that concerns not only the Soviet Union, Bulgaria's main 
ally, but also the German Federal Republic, where Agca and other alleged 
accomplices lived at various time~. 
On December 20th, 1982, Italian Defence minister Lelio Lagorio told Parliament, 
"The Bulgarian connection in this a!:fai1' provokes and justifies the most 
acute concern." He added that !oreign secret services might be involved in 
Italian terrorism and that in this context 31 :foreign diplomats, ten of 
thee :!rom eastelll Europe and 21 from Libya, had been expelled :!rom Italy since 
1980. Foreign minister Colo:cbo criticised Bulgaria !or its unwillingness to 
cooperate in the investigation. 
1ne political problem is aggravated by the fact that Bulgaria, o! all Soviet-
bloc countries, is the one which has most blatantly encouraged and used 
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terrorist methods in Co~unity ~ember states during recent years, as 
mentioned above. 
The Italian investiga~ion has also revealed the possibility of Bulgarian 
involvement in drug-runnin& and arms-peddling. The Bulgarian government, it 
is alleged, take a permissive attitude to these dealings and even exploit 
them to gain foreign currency. For instance, Bekir Celenk, the man who 
allegedly asked Agca to murder the Pope, is wanted in both Italy and Turkey 
on smuggling charges. These charges were repeated in the Italian Parliament 
by Justice minister Darida on December 20th, 1982. 
This report makes no judgement about Bulgarian or Soviet involve~ent in the 
attempt on the Pope's life. Those judgements must be made by the Italian 
courts. Still, there is no hiding the !act that the whole cur.ky story has 
serious political consequences, which the Ten would be well advised to 
consider most carefully, using all the available machinery. 
Soviet-Bloc Clandestine Manipulation of Community Public Ooinion 
Your rapporteur believes that the Soviet Union is !ully entitled to seek 
to influence public opinion in our member countries, using any means that 
is lawful and open. They may sell us books and periodicals, beam radio 
broadcasts towards us in our various languages, speak to us through 
diplomatic representatives, contribute letters and articles to our newspapers, 
appear on our radio and television programmes. 
They may suggest that the neutron bomb, Cruise and Pershing II are evil 
weapons, whereas the SS-20 is not evil, that !\ATO is an aggressive alliance, 
whereas the 'l'iarsaw Pact i10 defensive and seeks peace. They are free to 
dis~emina~e ~his pain~ of view throughout our Cocmunity and those who 
support ~ATO are free to put forward the opposite view. 
However, the use of Soviet propaganda becomes improper when it is disguised 
with a non-Soviet facade, inserted surreptitiously into a non-Soviet body 
or put :!orv;ard in the :!arm of deliberate forgeries. 
In recent years, a10 detente has run into difficulties, Soviet intelligence 
has stepped up a campaign known as "active measures" that depends on the 
use of disinformation, forgeries, front groups and other secret activit•es. 
Soviet "active measures" should not be confused with public propaganda 
or diplomacy. 
A well known tactic is the :!orl,:ed document al!lounting to a "revelation" 
of aggressive western policy or of interference, usually by the United 
States, in the internal affairs of other countries. These documents arrive 
through the mail usually without a covering letter, always v;i thout a· re~urn 
n2.!lle or address. Sometimes the "sender" apologises for his ov.'ll anonymity, 
pleading that he fears for his life or career. 
Some docUI!:ents are signed by well known military or political personalities. 
Others are marked with an exaggerated high security classification. This is 
to enhance the news value of the forgery and to make sure that it is given 
prol!linent local exposure. 
Some of the forgeries are ~ut together with great skill. ~ey are photocopies, 
but they carry what look llke genuine letterheads and s~gnatures, sometimes 
even genuine and little known codewords. They are compiled v.•ith great care 
and detail. A local political group would not have the technical expertise 
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or the necessary information. 
An exacple of this technique is the "Clarh.-Stearns Letter", which surfaced 
in Athens in Januar~· 1982. It purported to be a letter :from the then under-
secretary of state William Clark to the US Acbassador in Greece, Monteagle 
Stearns, i11dicating that the United States might support a military coup 
in Greece in order to preserve American bases there. It was sent to Athens 
newspapers in plain envelopes without a return address and, although· it was 
never published, it was calculated to worsen relations between the United 
States and Greece's socialist government. 
Another exacple wa& the "Haig-Luns Letter", allegedly sent by the then 
SuprP~ Allied Co~ander to the NATO secretary general. It referred to 
"current projects for the limited use of US nuclear forces in Europe in an 
emerr;"!ncy and to the possibility of NATO "being :forced to make first use 
of l">.tC.lear weapons". Although denounced at once as a forgery, it was printed 
in ~ne Belcian weekly De Nieuwe and in the Luxembourg communist newspaper 
Zeitung \AJll U:!tze!:x.Jrger VOLlek in P4:Jri l 1982. 
During the Falklands crisis a forged press release attributing insulting 
recarks to defence secretary Casper \'ieinherger was circulated among the 
Washington diplomatic community. It said that the United States was 
supporting Hri tain in the Falklands war so as to establish an American 
military base there ":fro1:1 which we will assert our control of the whole 
of the Latin-American continent". A year later a forged tape of a 
tel&phone conversation between President Reagan and Prime ~Hnister 
Thatcher, designP.d to discredit both learlers, was sent to the Dutch 
newspaper De Telegraa:! wi tb an inaccurate transcript in the Dutch language. 
In March 1983 a letter purportedly signed by the Acerican trade union 
leader lrving Brown to an ltalian labour official, Luigi Scricciolo, 
appeared in the weekly Sette Giorni. Scricciol~ was at that tine under 
arrest and had admitted working !or Bulgarian intelligence. The letter, 
which was a forgery, suggested that Scricciolo had been used by the CIA 
to channel funds to the Polish trade union Solidarity. It was presumably 
designed both to discredit Solidarity and to undermine Scricciolo's 
credibility. 
In March 1983 a senior Ghanaian o:Uici al toid a press conference that, 
according to a report issued by the FGR embassy in Accra, the CIA was 
planning to overthrow the Ghanaian government. The German government 
declared that the document was a !orgery, but not before it had been widely 
printed in the Ghanaian press, where it was accepted as genuine. 
Other damaging forgeries to have surfaced in recent years include a letter 
from President Reagan to the King of Spain (Nove~ber 1981) in which the King 
is invited to crush Spanish opposition to NATO entry. There was also the 
re-publication in London in October 1980 o! "Top Secret Documents on US 
Forces Headquarters in Europe", subtitled "Holocaust Again for Europe". 
The Arne Petersen Case 
In April 1982 the Danish minister for justice, Ole Espersen,announced 
that Soviet intelligence o!!icers had attempted to use a Danish journalist, 
Arne Herlov Petersen, in order to manipulate Danish public opinion, 
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specifically by publishing at l:ioviet expense advertisements in newspapers 
in which well known Danish cultural figures supported the concept of a 
Nordic nuclear-free sone. 
Petersen also printed a pamphlet in English called "True Blues: The Thatcher 
that Couldn 1 t Mend Her Own Roof". According to the Danish government, the 
text was supplied by the Soviet embassy in Copenhagen which also paid the 
costs of publication. It contained a number of insulting comments about 
Prit:!e l!inister Thatcher, indicating that there was a difference of opinion 
between herself and foreign secretary Carrington over relations with eastern 
Europe. 
The Danish governt:!ent said that Mr Petersen bad received quantities o:f alcohol, 
cigarettes ar1d other giits from the Soviet embassy and bad trayelled to the 
Soviet Union free of charge. He bad received monQ~ to pay the expenses of 
Soviet-sponsored adver~isements and publicat1ons. 
The Ministry of Justice announced that '-lr Petersen would not be prosecuted, 
since Danish interests bad not been d~aged to any great extent. They did 
however make a full statement of the facts, which Mr Petersen did not contest, 
and his main Soviet ecbassy contact Vladimir ~lerkulov was declared persona 
non grata. 
Soviet Front Organisations 
This report makes: no comment about organisations which are openly organised 
and funded by the Soviet Union and her allies. In our democratic system the 
Soviet Union is as entitled as any other body to support political movements 
of which it approves, including political parties, whether col!:lDunist or 
otherwise, provided that this support is: overt and lawful. Howe•.·<:·: a dangerous 
and destabilising effect is: produced when Soviet support !or any such body 
amounts to secret control of that body 1 s activities, v:hether by political or 
financial llleans. This 15: what is meant by a "front organisation". 
The best known front organisation is the World Peace Council, whose head-
quarters is at L8nnrotinkatu 25A, Helsinki 18, Finland. It was originally 
based in Pa~~~. but in 1951 it was expelled by the French government for 
":!ifth-colWIUl activities". It moved to Prague and then to Vienna, but in 
1957 it was banned by the Austrian interior ministry for "activities 
directed against the Austrian s:tate". It moved to Helsinki in 1968. 
Tb.e WPC claims to have branches in 135 countries. It publishes journals 
in English, French, German, Spanish and other languages. Its Presidential 
Committee includes members of the national parliacents of our ten member 
states and two European Parliament members. It claims: to be a non-governmental 
organisation funded by private contributions. In fact, its activity and 
funding are controlled by the Soviet government, 
In February 1981 the ~~C appeared before the UN Comcittee of Non-Governmental 
Organisations requesting consultative status witb the tconolllic and Social 
Council. The application was withdrawn, however, after the ~~ representative 
adlllitted that the financial statement he had sho~~ the Committee covered 
only a small part of the WPC's income and expenses. ~iembers of the Comcittee 
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obsoerved that WPC received large &cale financial &upport :from government 
soources and bad gone to great pains to conceal this; !act. 
WPC President Romesb Chandra said in Dececber 1976 that detente would mean 
no reduction in the struggle against imperialism. He added, "Detente meam; 
the intensification of the struggle, but in new :forms •••• ". Mr Chandra 
was awarded the Order of Lenin in 1977. 
The WPC has never taken a position at variance wi tb Soviet foreign policy. 
It attacks NATO and the European Co~unity. It never attacks the Warsaw Pact 
or C~ffiA. It unwaveringly supported the Soviet viewpoint over the Hungarian 
uprising in 1956, the Cuba missile crisis in 1962, the Soviet invasions; 
of Csechoslovakia (1968) and Afghanistan (1979). 
Improper Behaviour of Soviet Press and J.!edia Repres;en tati ves 
Soviet journalist&, who are accredited to Comcunity countries in large 
numbers, do not confine their activity to ne~gathering. Several have been 
expelled from member states; in recent years, some for espionage, c .hers 
for iwproper interference in local politics; amounting to subversion. 
The most flagrant example of this occurred recently near the Community's 
borders in Bern, Switzerland. In April 1983 the- Swiss government clo&ed 
the Bern bureau of the Soviet newsagency "Novosti" and expelled its local 
director. Two of Novosti's Swiss employees bad, with the knowledgE ·f their 
Soviet bosses, been "influencing the Swiss Peace Movement :from ~~O~(.;ow's 
point of view" and "inciting young people to delinquency". 
The Swiss government went on to sotate that the Novosti bureau had helped 
organise a large demonstration in Bern in Decez::ber 1981. They distr:!.buted 
leaflets prepared in the Novosti o!fice and even took part in para-military 
exercises;. And in July 1982 they bad helped organisoe a distu"bance during 
a session of the Swiss parliament. 
Novosti's Bern bureau, the Swiss government statement concluded, had ~ccome 
"a centre of disinfoi'lllation, subversion and agitation through the use of 
'active cea&ures;' on Moscow's orders". Its actions amounted to a violation 
of Swiss soovereignty. 
Soviet-Bloc Technical and Scientific Espionage 
As East-West relations have deteriorated, there has been an intensification 
in Soviet efforts to acquire by clandestine means the fruits of west 
European industrial and technical achievement. Soviet industry has habitually 
imitated western design in the construction of technical goods. Their copies 
range from the Leica camera to the Concorde airliner. In recent years 
they have made up for their o~n lack of invention by expanding their network 
of in formation-gathers in western factories, universities and research 
establishments. 
There has in 1983 been an alarming increase in the numbers of Soviet repre-
sentatives expelled fro~:~ Collllllunity countries. There have been no such 
expulsions from Greece or Luxembourg since the beginning of 1981. In the 
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other ei~~t ~ember states there were four expulsions in 1981 and six in 
1982. In the period January-September 1983 there were 68 expulsions -
47 from France, !ive from FGR, five from UK, !our from Italy, three from 
Ireland, two !rom Belgium and one each !rom Denmark and the Netherlands. 
Those expelled were mainly diplomats, but they also included trade officials, 
journalists, an Aero!lot official, two Morflot (merchant navy) officials, 
eoployees of UNESCO and the International Wheat Council and a diplomat's wife. 
The French expulsion o! 47 Soviet diplomats and other officials in April 
1983 was the largest since the expulsion of 105 by the United Kingdom in 
1971. There had only been about 15 such expulsions from France in the 
previous 20 years. The French interior ministry explained that their 
counter-espionage had uncovered "agents of the secret services of the 
Soviet Union engaged in systematic search on French territory :!or tech-
nological and scientific in::formation, particularly in the military area". 
Sever~French citizens were also arrested in this connection. 
Former French interior ::~inister Michel Poniatowski said in an interview 
with Le Matin on April 7th, "In France the KGB J::anipulates about 10,000 
individuals, whether they are aware of it or not. As a general rule, 
one-third of the (Soviet) diplomatic staff belongs to the KGB. They are 
one-third o! the total KGB staff, the rest working mainly !or Aeroflot 
or Intourist. This ::~akes 200 agents on whom 400 others depend. Normally 
each one manipulates 15 to 20 people •.••• Tbe pril:lary motive o! the KGB 
is destabilisation." 
Conclusions 
lt is there!ore your rapporteur's view that during the past !ew years, 
as East-\',"est relations ha\•e worsened, there has been an increase in the 
level o! ioproper behaviour by representatives of the Soviet Union and 
her allies in Co~unity countries. 
1 do not conclude that the Soviet Union is directly involved in terrorist 
acts, but I believe that ber failure to restrain her close ally Bulgaria, 
which is dependent on her, is a cause :for considerable concern. So is the 
inflammatory nature of Soviet pronouncements on their support :for move~ents 
of national liberation. Terrorism is encouraged by such pronouncements. 
It should also be noted that the West has never encouraged terrorism in 
Warsaw Pact countries. It has attacked the governcents of these countries 
on coral and ideological &rounds. Some western representatives have 
encouraged dissenters in those countries, but only non-violent dissenters. 
And in those Warsaw Pact countries there is no terrorism. 
Secondly, your rapporteur is also concerned at the step-up in Soviet 
"active measures", especially through the forgery o:f dOCUJ:Ients designed 
to sow disagreement in the western alliance and in the encouragement, often 
without the knowledge of the protesters themselves, of pacifist protests. 
Thirdly, there must be concern about the increase in Soviet espionage 
activity in our ten countries, especially in the heightened Soviet interest 
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in acquiring west European technology by improper means. 
The Ten should therefore seize every opportunity to coordinate their 
resistance to the i~proper and destabilising activities of our fellow-
Europeans in the East. They should discuss the problem within the political 
cooperation machinery at every level. They should raise the problem in 
contacts with the Soviet Union and her allies, especially in the United 
Nations and in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. 
They should try to make the Soviet Union and her allies understand that 
this is:; somethi.ng that can further damage East-West relations, rendering 
any return to the path of detente more remote. 
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ANNEX I 
MOTION FOR ARESOLUTION (Doe. 1-1074/82) 
tabled by Mr ZAGARI, Mr FERRI, Mr RIPA DI MEANA, Mr DIDO', Mr PELIKAN, 
Mr ARFE', Mrs MACCIOCCHI, Mr LEZZI, Mr GATTO and Mr ORLANDI 
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure 
on the threat to peace posed by the emergence of international links between 
some secret services and their efforts to destabilize countries in the Western 
hemisphere. 
A - which has consistently appealed for respec~ for the Treaties as 
the basis for a stable international order and consistently supported 
all the acts, such as the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act which 
are desi;ned to preserve peace, 
9 - deeply disturbed by the disclosures of attempts to cause international 
destabilization which have culminated in the assassination attempt 
against Pooe John Paul II in Rome, 
C - taking into account that some of the Judicial inquiries in Italy 
1nto the attack on John Paul 11, and i~to terrorist dctivities and 
arms t~afficking have revealed indications of responsioility and links 
with the secret services of an Eastern bloc country, Bulgaria, 
D- considering that this destabilization factor, in the wake of others, 
could provoke an irreversible crisis with ominous consequences, 
Calls on the Council ot Ministers meeting in political cooperation 
to mor.1tor ver1 closely the developme~t of the situation and to work 
out ~n1form positions and joint initiatives by the EEC countries in 
~rder to oppose effectively any activities which run counter to the 
tenets of international law and to the basic princip~es of human 
society. 
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ANNEX I! 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (Doe. 1-1076/82) 
tabled by Mr ANTONIOZZI, Mr BETTIZA, Mr VISENTINI, Sir James SCOTT-HOPKINS, 
Mr RIPA Dl MEANA, Mr DE LA MALENE, Mr BARBI, Mr ADONNINO, Mr PONIATOWSKI, 
Mr PFLIMLIN, Mr DONNEZ, Mr RUMOR, Lord O'HAGAN, Mrs CASSAMAGNAGO CERRETTI, 
Mr JUNOT, Mr GIUMMARRA, Mr HABSBURG, Mr BATTERSBY, Mr von WOGAU, Mr PURVIS, 
Mrs SCHLEICHER, Mr CALVEZ, Mr JONKER, Mr CECOVINI, Mr KLEPSCH, Mr GAWRONSK!, 
Mr LIGIOS, Mr BOCKLET, Mr MACARIO, Mr VANDEWIELE, Mr NARDUCCI, Mr LUCKER, 
Mr TRAVAGLINI, Mr GONTIKAS, Mr STELLA, Mr TOLMAN, Mr GIAVAZZI, Mr van ROMPUY, 
Mr DIANA, Mr PAPAEFSTRATIOU, Mrs LENZ, Mr VERROKEN, Mr DEL DUCA, Mr PENDERS, 
Mr BARBAGLI, Mrs LENTZ-CORNETTE, Mr COLLESELLI, Mr WEDEKIND, Mr LEGA, 
Mr MODIANO and Mr SEITLINGER 
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure 
on the~nternational Links between secret services and on their destabilizing 
activities in Western countries. 
A. concerned at the numerous c~i~inal acts which have occurred in Western 
countries, culminating in the recent atte~pt on the life of 
Pope John-P~ul II, 
B. aware that, in the course of legal proceeoings, l1nks are emerging which 
con~cct the ~ecret services of Eastern European countries - in particular 
of aulgaria ~ith terrorism, arms trafficking and activities aimed at 
destabilizing both internal and internatio~al pol:~ical batances, 
Requests the Council of Mi~isters meeti~g in political cooperation to obtain 
more detailed specific information about such act~vities and to react w1th 
appropriate political me~sures to counter what ~mounts to a danger to peace 
dnd peac~fut human coexi~tence and to discourage zny future resort to 
unacceptable forms cf behaviour or activity i~ international relations, in 
total disregard for tre~ties, conventio~s a~d the Charters of the United 
Nations and of Helsink1. 
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RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AT ITS SITTING ON 13 JANUARY 1983 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RESCL'L'TlON 
on dcst:~bilizing :activities of E.:atcm countries' secret services on the territory of the Community lnd the 
Western World 
Ti:e E:trope.::n P.:.rliamenr, 
A. concerned at the extre:ne grav1ry of the facts emergmg from the mvestigat1ons being 
conducted by the Italian mag1strarure and authorities after the attempted assassination of 
John-Paul Il and into the international !i.'lks of terrorism and the arms trade, 
, 
B. indig!'l:mt at the ac.:usations of subversive acnvities in Poland made by the Soviet press 
agamst Pope John·P:l\:lll, who has himsc!f bee!l :he VIctim or terronst lctiVJtJes, 
C. havmg re:;:~rd to :he steps taken by the Italian Gove~me:lt to inform t."&e ~ATO 
countries of the cnm in its relations with Bulgaria, 
1. C;;ils on the F?retgn ~1inisters meeting in Political Cooper.:mon to speak our :~gainst 
these desr:~bdizmg fac:wrs \\ ru6 thre:uen i:ue:::al mstmmons and mrernaoonal peace, 
2. Cons1ders th:lt dose cooperauon and an improvement in the channels of ir.iormaoon 
between tne Te::. mav he!p :o srrer:gt~en thei.r deience agamst action oi this sort, 
3. Wit:-. ::-.:s e!'lci 1:1 >'tew. c.;.ils ~or real ;>regress :owarcis the c:e:mon oi a European JUciicial 
1~e::: \Vh1cn w1ii consr::t:te J.n :;ppropriace for.:1 of coll:tborarion and cooperation aga:nst ail 
r.~ar.oeuvres a:med at cesraotilzanon anci all :e:ronst activiry, 
4. bstruc:s its Poiincal Ai£a1rs Commmee to report on the poiitiol implications and :he 
.:onsequences to be llrawn :Tom rh1s s1ruanon, 
5. Instructs t:s Pres1dent :o forward :h1s resoiucion to the Commission, the Councli, :ne 
Foreign :\1mmers mee:mg m ?oliucal Cooperation and the Governments of the ~lember 
Snres. 
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ANNEX IV 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (Doe. 1-361/83) 
tabled by Mr HABSBURG, Mr d'ORMESSON, Mr ZECCHINO, Mr KLEPSCH, Mr PEDINI 
and Mr WAWRZIK 
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure 
on attempted terrorist subversion in the Member States and various associated 
countries. 
The European Parliament, 
A. concerned at the growing number of terrorist outrages foreboding a 
fresh wave of violence, 
B. deeply perturbed by terrorist and subversive activities at international 
level both in the Member States and various associated countries, 
C. whereas the terrorist movements have been shown to be linked and 
relations between the undercover organizations of the Eastern bloc 
states and the areas where terrorism, training camps, the arms trade 
and subversion develop are aimed at disrupting the political balance 
within the European Community and at international level, 
D. whereas this subversive factor and terrorist activity could create an 
irreversible crisis with tragic consequences, 
1. Calls on the Foreign Ministers meeting in political cooperation to 
intensify their investigations, to monitor extremely closely the 
course of events and to take the necessary political and legal 
measures to prevent any further such machinations which represent a 
:h~~at to peace and are in breach of Treatie~ agreements, the U.N. 
Charter and the Final Act of Helsinki. 
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